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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia: President Sukarno has appointed a high proportion of leftists, including the Communist party chairman, to executive bodies in the National Front, which Sukarno heads and which he probably intends to develop as Indonesia's single political party. The army's representation is fairly submerged in the Front hierarchy. Sukarno appears to have shelved temporarily his efforts to include Communists in the cabinet; instead, he is promoting them in other government organizations in the hope of gradually working them into the direct line of government, despite army objections.

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III. THE WEST

Haiti: President Duvalier's roughshod methods against the opposition and the Roman Catholic Church in Haiti appear to be increasing the numbers and effectiveness of those opposed to him. The immediate issue--student resistance to

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DAILY BRIEF

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government efforts to convert the school system into a political instrument--is now being exploited by factions of the underground opposition, including a group believed to be linked to Haiti's small Communist movement. The expulsion of the two top members of the church hierarchy and a number of priests for alleged support of the student "agitators" weakens the anti-Communist position. Barring the always possible eruption of mass rioting, however, the regime will probably weather the current crisis, since it still seems to have the support of the army.

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LATE ITEM

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DAILY BRIEF

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Sukarno Appoints High Proportion of Leftists to National Front Executive Bodies

President Sukarno has appointed a high proportion of leftists, including Communist party chairman Aidit, to executive bodies in his new National Front. Contrary to Indonesian Army expectations, army leaders hold no special position in the Front hierarchy. Approximately 32 percent of the 70 members of the Front's central board are members of the Indonesian Communist party or appear susceptible to Communist direction; approximately 20 percent are army oriented. Aidit and Army Chief of Staff General Nasution are two of seven equally ranking vice chairmen; the remaining five are likely to look primarily to Sukarno for guidance. The secretary general of the organization, Sudibjo, is a weak personality who in the past has appeared to be a Communist dupe.

The National Front is intended to function through a multi-level structure ranging from the executive board in Djakarta to village organizations throughout the nation. Its purpose is twofold: to strengthen national unity and to provide mass support for the government, thereby making "guided democracy" work. According to Sukarno's plan, all political parties and functional groups will work through the Front--submerging their identities and interests to do so.

Only the superstructure of the organization has yet been appointed; other levels, however, are likely to reflect the composition of the executive and central boards. Once the organization is activated, it is likely to provide a formidable and protected vehicle for use by the Communists.

Sukarno appears to have bowed temporarily to army opposition and abandoned his efforts to include Communists in the cabinet. Instead, he is promoting them in other government organizations in the apparent hope of gradually working them into the direct line of government despite army objections.

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Haiti Facing New Political Crisis

President Francois Duvalier's roughshod methods against the opposition and the Roman Catholic Church in Haiti appear to be increasing the number and effectiveness of those actively opposed to him. The immediate issue--student resistance to the government's efforts to convert the school system into a political instrument of the regime--is being exploited by factions of the underground opposition, apparently including a group linked to Haiti's small Communist movement.

A rash of opposition mimeographed bulletins that appeared on the streets of the capital on 12 January included strike calls for both high school and university students. The bulletins have a high political content and student grievances are secondary, suggesting that more experienced oppositionists than the students are directing the moves. One leaflet, issued by a group calling itself the Popular Party for National Liberation, calls for the formation of a popular front to oust Duvalier. The only previous public act by this group was last May Day when it issued a Communist-line tract.

Noise bombs were exploded in two schools on 11 January, and attendance at the secondary and elementary schools of the capital, recently reopened after a six-week "vacation period," is reported to have declined. The university, closed by the regime last November, is scheduled to reopen on 16 January, but the majority of the students are expected to respect the strike call.

The position of the Roman Catholic Church, which is not strong in Haiti, has been further weakened by Duvalier's summary expulsion of the archbishop last November and of his successor and a number of other priests this week. They were charged with supporting the student "agitators." The Vatican's 12 January excommunication of all officials responsible for the expulsions will probably lead to further efforts by the President

to "Haitianize" the church, which has long been under attack for the fact that most priests in Haiti have been foreigners, mainly French.

Barring the always possible eruption of mass violence in Port-au-Prince, the regime will probably survive the current crisis. The Haitian Army, the key to the political situation, still appears to be supporting the President.

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Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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